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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, acts of terrorism and an increasingly unstable
global economy have resulted in increased emphasis on national
security.1 In order to achieve a higher level of security, U.S. citizens
have suffered the consequences of more aggressive and invasive
security measures.2 While most U.S. citizens would probably agree
that they would sacrifice some individual liberties in the name of
security, where will the line be drawn?3
As national security plays a larger role in our daily lives, U.S. law
enforcement officers man the front lines in keeping our cities and
communities safe.4 Recently, however, police across the country have
1. For example, eleven days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the White House
appointed the first Director of Homeland Security to “overs[ee] and coordinate[] a comprehensive national
strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism and . . . future attacks.” Creation of the Department of
Homeland Security, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., http://www.DHS.gov/Creation-Department-HomelandSecurity (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). One year later, in November 2002, Congress created the Department
of Homeland Security with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which sought to “reduce
the vulnerability of . . . [and] ensure . . . the overall economic security of the United States.” Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101(a)(1)(B), (F), 116 Stat. 2135, 2142, (codified as
amended at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
2. See Siobhan Gorman, Spy Agency Activities Violated Fourth Amendment Rights, Letter Discloses,
WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044409790457753941313
7490028.html (discussing a “secret national security court[‘s]” ruling that the National Security Agency
has conducted “spy activities [that] on at least one occasion have violated the Fourth Amendment”). This
article further discussed extensions to the Patriot Act that allow the use of “broad search warrants that
permit eavesdropping [on] categories of people . . . rather [than] requiring warrants for individual people.”
Id.
3. In a Gallup Poll conducted in August 2011, 71% of Americans believed that “the government
should take steps to prevent additional acts of terrorism but not if those steps would violate [their] basic
civil liberties.” Civil Liberties, GALLUP, http://www.Gallup.com/Poll/5263/Civil-Liberties.aspx (last
visited Mar. 3, 2014). In comparison, 25% of Americans stated that “the government should take all steps
necessary to prevent additional acts of terrorism in the U.S. even if it means [their] basic civil liberties
would be violated,” while 4% had no opinion on the matter. Id. Despite the poll’s findings, the continuing
public outrage since Edward Snowden revealed information concerning the United States’ spy operations
suggests that a large number of U.S. citizens are not willing to give up their privacy in the name of national
security. See Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US Spy Programme, BBC WORLD NEWS (Jan. 17,
2014, 9:56 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964.
4. The mission statements for police departments across the country generally seek to “safeguard the
lives and property of the people” they serve and to work with “communities to improve their quality of
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become “increasingly militarized.”5 Local police forces now arm
themselves with military equipment6 (e.g., armored personnel carriers
that fire .50 caliber rounds,7 helicopters, and amphibious tanks)8 with
the authorization and at the expense of the federal government.9
While spotting the traditional arms expansion of power amongst our
law enforcement agencies is easy, the non-traditional expansion—the
increasing use of covert technology and furtive tactics—is not so
apparent. Police departments have begun to test the constitutional
limits of their actions,10 employing techniques “once reserved for
overseas intelligence . . . to domestic criminal investigations.”11
life.” The Mission Statement of the LAPD, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.LAPDOnline.org/Inside_
The_LAPD/content_basic_view/844 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014); e.g., Mission Statement, ATLANTA
POLICE DEP’T, http://www.Atlantapd.org/Mission.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (whose mission seeks
to “ensur[e] the safety of our citizens and build[] trust in partnership with our community”); Mission,
N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/mission.shtml (last visited
Mar. 2, 2014) (whose mission seeks to “enhance the quality of life in our City” and “provide for a safe
environment”); Chicago Police Department’s Mission, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, https://portal.chicagopolice.
org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/About%20CPD/Our%20Mission (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (noting that
the Chicago Police Department is “part of, and empowered by, the community . . . to protect”).
5. Erik Kain, Police Militarization in the Decade Following 9/11, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2011, 11:01
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/09/12/police-militarization-in-the-decade-following911/.
6. See Benjamin F. Carlson, Battlefield Main Street, BENJAMIN F. CARLSON (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://benjaminfcarlson.com/?p=396 (noting that orders for surplus military equipment under the
government’s 1033 program in 2012 increased “400 percent over the same period in 2011”). Under the
1033 program, the Department of Defense authorizes the transfer of excess military equipment to local
law enforcement departments. Id.
7. Radley Balko, Sheriff Lott’s New Toy, HIT & RUN BLOG (Sept. 1, 2008, 1:12 PM),
http://Reason.com/blog/2008/09/01/sheriff-lotts-new-toy.
8. Carlson, supra note 6.
9. The National Defense Authorization Act allows the Department of Defense to transfer excess
personal property to support law enforcement activities. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 2576a, 110 Stat. 2422, 2639 (1996) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of U.S.C.). Under the program, “the Secretary of Defense may transfer . . . arms and ammunition,
that the Secretary determines [are] . . . suitable for use by the agencies in law enforcement activities . . .
and . . . excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.” National Defense Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C.
§ 2576a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). In addition, the program allows the law enforcement agencies to receive the
property “without charge[,]” only having to reimburse the Department of Defense for charges associated
with the transfer. Id. § 2576a(b)–(c).
10. Compare United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 952–53 (2012) (finding an unreasonable
search where police obtained evidence against the defendant through the use of a Global Positioning
System (GPS) that they attached to the defendant’s car after their warrant had expired), with United States
v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–79 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that police did not violate defendant’s Fourth
Amendment protections when they tracked his location using his cell phone, reasoning that the same
information could have been obtained through visual surveillance), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013)
(mem.).
11. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Patriot Act: The Kitchen-Sink Approach to National Security, N.Y.
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One area in which law enforcement agencies have stretched
constitutional limits concerns the scope of a suspect’s consent to
search his or her vehicle.12 Police forces across the country have tested
the limits of consent by asking vague, conversational questions to
suspects with the goal of obtaining a suspect’s consent to search, even
though that individual may not want to allow the search or may not
know that he or she has the right to deny consent.13 Conversational
phrases like “Can I take a quick look?”14 or “Can I take a quick look
around?”15 have “emerg[ed] as . . . a regular part of police jargon.”16
When people answer these questions in the affirmative—thus
consenting to a search—courts have diverged on the question of what
people have actually agreed to.17 Have they given up any right at all?
Or, have they just consented to a full search? Part I of this Note will
describe the history of consent and its interplay with the U.S.
Constitution.18 Part II will then examine and analyze how courts have
interpreted the scope of consent in a variety of “conversational consent
search” cases.19 Finally, Part III will analyze a variety of potential
solutions to the issues conversational consent searches present and
ultimately propose that courts should adopt a narrow interpretation of
the search scope granted by a conversational consent.20

MAG. (Aug. 27, 2011), http://nymag.com/news/9-11/10th-anniversary/patriot-act/.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000).
13. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the right to
refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge
as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”).
14. See, e.g., Wald, 216 F.3d at 1225.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 2008).
16. Dru Stevenson, Consenting to “Quick Look” Police Searches, CIRCUIT SPLITS (Apr. 8, 2012, 3:21
PM), http://www.CircuitSplits.com/2012/04/Consenting-To-Quick-Look-Police-Searches.html#more.
17. Compare United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667–68 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that
consent to “‘look in’” an automobile “is the equivalent of a . . . general consent to search”), with Wald,
216 F.3d at 1228 (holding that when defendant allowed the officer “‘to take a quick look inside the
vehicle’” the “‘consent did not go any further than the interior of the vehicle’” (quoting the district court)).
18. See discussion infra Part I.
19. See discussion infra Part II.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of Consent Law
In the United States criminal justice system, the idea of an individual
consenting to a search by a law enforcement officer stems from the
“interplay” of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.21 The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause.”22 Meanwhile, the pertinent portion of the
Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”23 Much debate has
surrounded the definition of a “search” under the Fourth Amendment,
the intricacies of which fall outside the scope of this note.24 However,
courts have developed a much clearer definition of a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.25 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court stated that
a seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”26
On its face, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a requirement
that a warrant be issued whenever a government official performs a

21. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947) (per curiam).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
455 (1948) (noting that the Constitution contains a warrant requirement “so that an objective mind might
weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law”).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. The modern-day definition of a search under the Fourth Amendment comes from the seminal case
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347. While Katz did not provide a bright line rule, the majority opinion
stated “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Id. at 351. Perhaps the more well-known and
applied test came from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting that people have a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy” (emphasis
added)).
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
26. Id.; see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (“A person is seized by the police
and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘by
means of physical force or show of authority,’ terminates or restrains his freedom of movement . . . .”
(quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (internal quotations omitted)).
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search,27 and courts have long recognized situations in which police
do not need a warrant to conduct a search.28
One of the most widely recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement—and the one at the heart of “quick look” police
searches—is the voluntary consent search.29 Courts first applied the
voluntary consent principle in 1946.30 In early opinions on the issue,
the Supreme Court validated police searches based on one’s voluntary
consent, reasoning that an individual had knowingly waived a
“constitutional right.”31 As more consent cases progressed through the
courts, however, the Supreme Court shifted gears—now holding that
individuals need not know that they are abandoning a legal right in
order for consent to be valid.32 This premise justified a new theory—
27. The plain meaning of the text implies that warrants are not necessary in the event the police
perform a reasonable search or seizure. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This seems to be the foundation for
the many exceptions to the warrant rule, which include the following:
investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizures of
items in plain view, searches and seizures justified by exigent circumstances, consent
searches, searches of vehicles, searches of containers, inventory searches, border searches,
searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special needs of law
enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 37, 37–38 (2006).
28. See Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 27, at 37–38. For example, it is “well
established” that courts have long accepted searches and seizures by police “without a warrant” of items
in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); see Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 128–29 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plain view search to be valid, the officer (1) must have a
legal right to “arriv[e] at the place” where (2) the item can be “plainly viewed” and (3) the “incriminating
character” of the item is “‘immediately apparent’” (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466)). Among other
exceptions, courts also allow searches incident to lawful arrest. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762–63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested . . . . Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.”).
29. See Christo Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1171, 1171–
72 & n.2 (2007) (“State actors rely on consent to search more than any other basis to justify a governmental
intrusion on Fourth Amendment protections . . . .”).
30. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (holding that when “petitioner . . . specifically
agreed to permit inspection . . . , he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy which he otherwise might
have had”), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947) (per curiam). As discussed in the remainder of the section,
however, courts no longer analyze voluntary consent searches on the basis of waiver but rather the
“reasonableness” portion of the Fourth Amendment. See discussion, infra notes 31–33 and accompanying
text.
31. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (noting that petitioner could only waive a
constitutional right through “word or deed” and emphasizing the fact that an individual needs to know
that he is giving up a legal right in order to waive it).
32. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996) (adding that there is no requirement that officers
inform a seized person that he has the right to refuse a search); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
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one other than waiver—to support consent searches. Accordingly,
courts now hold that voluntary consent searches are constitutional
because the consent search is a “reasonable” search.33
B. Modern Day Consent Law
While courts first recognized voluntary consent in 1946, they did
not lay out more stringent guidelines until 1973 when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided a landmark consent case, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.34 In Schneckloth, the defendant was charged with
possession of a check with intent to defraud.35 Police found the
evidence that formed the basis for the charge—three “[w]added up”
checks—during a consent search of a vehicle in which the defendants
were riding.36 The “precise question” that the court decided was “what
must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that a consent was
‘voluntarily’ given.”37 As the court put it, voluntariness has “no
talismanic definition[,]”38 but rather in determining voluntariness one
should look at “the totality of all the circumstances.”39 Some of the
factors that courts should weigh in determining voluntariness are:
(1) knowledge of the constitutional right to refuse consent; (2) age,
intelligence, education, and language ability; (3) the degree to
which the individual cooperates with the police; (4) the
individual’s attitude about the likelihood of the discovery of
contraband; and (5) the length of detention and the nature of
U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
33. E.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990) (analyzing the consent issue on the ground
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment). The idea of “reasonableness” comes from the language
of the Fourth Amendment itself. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172.
34. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.
35. Id. at 219.
36. Id. at 220. The appellate court in the case stated that whether a suspect voluntarily offers his or her
consent is a “‘question of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances.’” Id. at 221 (quoting
People v. Michael, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (Cal. 1955)).
37. Id. at 223.
38. Id. at 224 (stating that voluntariness “cannot be taken literally to mean a ‘knowing’ choice. ‘Except
where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all
incriminating statements—even those made under brutal treatment—are “voluntary” in the sense of
representing a choice of alternatives’”).
39. Id. at 227.
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questioning, including the use of physical punishment or other
coercive police behavior.40

Since Schneckloth, courts have continued to tailor the requirements
necessary to show that an officer obtained valid, voluntary consent
from a suspect.41 In addition to the voluntariness requirement outlined
above, courts have required that the consent come from a person with
“actual”42 or “apparent”43 authority to give consent. Also—and the
most important requirement for the purpose of this note—to be
constitutional, an officer’s search “may not legally exceed the scope
of the consent supporting it.”44 Furthermore, courts will imply consent
from “the circumstances surrounding the search, by the person’s prior
actions or agreements, or by the person’s failure to object to the
search.”45

40. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 27, at 81–84 (also noting that “[n]o single factor
is dispositive” and that “the influence of drugs, intoxication, and mental agitation do not render consent
involuntary”).
41. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51 (1991); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
188 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
42. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 168–69.
43. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 194 n.1. Rodriguez held in part that the “determination of consent . . . must
‘be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the
moment . . . “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief”’ that the consenting party had authority
over the premises?” Id. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)) (second alteration in
original).
44. United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 382 (8th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court determined that
the permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search “is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 824 (1982); see Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 382 (finding the officer did not exceed the scope of consent
where he asked if he may look inside the trunk of the car, and after examining, he moved to the passenger
area of the car without objection from defendant); see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1980).
45. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 27, at 88. However, the “failure to object”
exception only applies to general consent searches and not to limited consent searches, such as when an
individual allows an officer to search one particular compartment or area. See, e.g., United States v.
Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We consistently and repeatedly have held a defendant’s
failure to limit the scope of a general authorization to search, and failure to object when the search exceeds
what he later claims was a more limited consent, is an indication the search was within the scope of
consent.”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss4/7

8

Mikhalevsky: The Conversational Consent Search: How “Quick Look” And Other Sim

2014]

THE CONVERSATIONAL CONSENT SEARCH

1085

C. The Voluntary Consent Search and its Relevance to
Conversational Consent Searches
Ever since courts have recognized the voluntary consent theory as
an exception to the warrant requirement, law enforcement officers
have made often use of it.46 The reasons for the vast increase in
voluntary consent searches have been widely addressed. In general, the
popularity of these searches stems from the fact that “consent is so
easily obtained,” and consent searches afford officers “the depth and
breadth of the search” that they want.47 Adding to the problem, most
people do not know that they have the right to refuse consent and—
unlike the attendant Fifth Amendment48—under the Fourth
Amendment, people need not know of their right to refuse consent in
order for it to be voluntary.49 As demonstrated in Schneckloth, a
person’s knowledge of the right to refuse is just one factor used to
determine voluntariness.50
Many legal theorists present other viable reasons for the widespread
use of consent searches. One such argument points out that studies
have shown that people feel pressure to consent when in the face of
authority.51 One study demonstrated that in certain circumstances
“very little pressure is needed to induce innocent people to confess” to
something that they did not do.52 During the study:

46. See Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172 n.2 (“Empirical studies do not exist, and cannot exist, to
support this proposition; rather, we must rely on common sense and informal, anecdotal reflections of
individual law enforcement officers from the cop-on-the beat to Transportation Safety Administration
(TSA) officers at airports to government building authorities, for example.”).
47. See id. at 1172.
48. In the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court stated that “in-custody interrogation
of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). Accordingly, for a confession to be deemed
voluntary “the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those
rights must be fully honored.” Id. (emphasis added).
49. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the right to refuse
consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the
sine qua non of an effective consent.”).
50. Id.
51. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT.
REV. 153, 172–79 (2002).
52. Id. at 178.
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[R]esearchers brought individual subjects into the laboratory and
asked them to perform a computer task. Subjects were warned not
to press the “Alt” key or the computer would crash. At a
preprogrammed moment, the computer did in fact crash, and the
experimenter accused the subject of having hit the forbidden key.
The experimenter then asked the subject to sign a written
confession stating, “I hit the ‘Alt’ key and caused the program to
crash. Data were lost.” . . . A total of 69% of subjects signed the
confession, admitting to a transgression that they did not in fact
commit.53

While results like this seem wholly illogical, the same can be said of
the countless number of defendants in criminal cases who voluntarily
consent to searches knowing that they have illegal substances or
contraband in their possession.
D. What Does This Mean for You and Me?
The idea of voluntary consent is at the heart of quick look and
conversational consent searches.54 As people consent to conversational
search requests by police officers—for whatever reason—the scope of
their consent is not abundantly clear. Does their conversational consent
allow an officer to search for five minutes or two hours? Just in the
trunk of the car or in the passenger section as well? Inside containers
or just what is in plain view? The list could go on-and-on and that is
precisely the problem with these conversational or quick look
searches; no clear boundaries exist.
53. Id. While an admission in the “Alt key” scenario does not carry the same consequences of
admission in a criminal context, various other studies and scenarios Nadler mentions carry equally grave
consequences. Id. at 174. For instance, Nadler describes a phenomenon known as “‘captainitis’”; members
of the crew notice that a pilot made a mistake, yet they fail to correct or mention the mistake “because
they convince themselves that if the captain has decided to do it, it must be right.” Id. Ultimately, plane
crashes have occurred because of this phenomenon. Id. Crew members aboard an airplane would likely
know the serious consequences of a pilot mistake exceed—or at the very least parallel—the severity of an
admission in the criminal context.
54. Throughout the Note I will use the terms “quick look search” and “conversational consent search”
to refer to a police officer’s conversational or misleading request for voluntary consent to search a
suspect’s vehicle. The various courts that have heard these types of cases have not yet branded them with
any label.
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Accordingly, courts are tasked with examining the surrounding
circumstances to determine the scope of consent granted. While some
courts have found that consent to a conversational search request does
not provide an officer with any investigative tools that he does not
already have—the ability to perform a plain view search, a search
incident to lawful arrest, a stop and frisk search, etc.—some courts
have held that consent to a conversational request to search grants the
officer a license to perform a full search.55 As individuals’ rights are
increasingly “trampled”56 by law enforcement agencies, it is important
for courts to provide a clearer standard by which officers should
operate.
II. TWO VIEWS ON THE SCOPE OF CONSENT GRANTED IN QUICK LOOK
POLICE SEARCHES
Courts have taken two differing views on the scope of consent
granted in quick look type cases.57 The more expansive view provides
that a suspect’s voluntary consent to a conversational search request
provides the officer with a general consent to search;58 the more
restrictive view limits the officer’s ability to search.59 A vast number
55. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 869 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667–68 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that consent to “‘look in’ a vehicle”
provides the officer with general consent to search the vehicle); United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Espinosa,
782 F.2d 888, 892–93 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225
(D. Kan. 2004) (holding that, where defendant consented to the officer’s request to “‘take a look’” in the
vehicle defendant was driving, defendant had provided the officer with a general consent to search), aff’d,
441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006).
56. Kain, supra note 5.
57. Compare United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a “‘quick
look’” only provides a limited right to search), with Rich, 992 F.2d at 504, 506 (finding that consent to
“‘have a look in’” defendant’s truck authorized the officer to search luggage located behind the passenger
seat).
58. E.g., United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999).
59. E.g., Rich, 992 F.2d at 506. In the vast majority of both the expanded and restrictive view cases,
courts address whether a suspect expressed any hesitation to the search because courts hold that a suspect’s
“failure to object” to the officer’s search “‘may be considered an indication that the search was within the
scope of consent.’” United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1368 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Espinosa, 782
F.2d at 892 (finding in part that, after the police had searched defendant’s motel room, defendant’s
subsequent failure to object to searching the room’s bathroom demonstrated that the search fell within the
scope of consent granted when defendant allowed the officers to look in his room)). In United States v.
Espinosa, the court found that a search by police at a border patrol checkpoint did not exceed the scope
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of cases in which a defendant argues that an officer exceeded his scope
of consent occur in the drug possession context.60 In drug possession
cases where the officer expresses that the “purpose of [his] search is to
look for drugs or contraband,” a suspect’s consent to the search
“‘implies that the officer’” is constitutionally permitted to “‘look
wherever drugs might be hidden.’”61
A. Restricted View of Consent
A minority of quick look type cases have taken the view that consent
provides a limited ability to search.62 Aside from United States v.
Wald—the leading restrictive view case—the vast majority of federal
cases finding that the officer exceeded the scope of consent do so based
on facts rather than an interpretation of the quick look or
conversational search request language.63 On the other hand, state
courts have been much more amenable than federal courts to narrow
interpretations of consent in quick look or conversational requests to
search.64
1. United States v. Wald
The leading restrictive view case is United States v. Wald.65 In Wald,
an officer stationed alongside a highway observed a vehicle—owned
of consent granted by a defendant where “[d]efendant stood beside his car expressing no concern during
[a] thorough and systematic search” which “lasted approximately fourteen minutes.” Espinosa, 782 F.2d
at 892. And “[a]t no time did defendant attempt to retract or narrow his consent” during the search. Id.
However, this single factor is not conclusive as determining the scope of consent “‘is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of the circumstances.’” Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228 (citing Pena, 920 F.2d at
1514).
60. See, e.g., Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d at 665–66 (case involving possession of 150 kilograms of
marijuana with intent to distribute); Wald, 216 F.3d at 1225 (case involving possession of drug
paraphernalia and methamphetamine); Pena, 143 F.3d at 1365 (case involving possession of and intent to
distribute crack cocaine).
61. United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Kan. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139, 1146–47 (10th Cir. 2002)), aff’d, 441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006).
62. See, e.g., Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228; United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir. 1997);
Jacobs v. State, 733 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d 1186, 1188
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
63. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1–2.
64. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
65. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1222.
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by defendant Wald, who was also a passenger in the vehicle—traveling
down the interstate with a “badly cracked front windshield.”66 The
officer noted that the two suspects in the vehicle—the driver and
defendant passenger—were “talkative[,]” “nervous[,]” and had
“glassy eyes.”67 Furthermore, the officer smelled the odor of burnt
methamphetamine.68 Based on the circumstances and his suspicion of
drug trafficking, the officer addressed the driver and the defendant:
“‘You wouldn’t mind if I take a quick look, would you?’”69 Both
responded no, and the officer proceeded to perform a “pat-down”
search of the suspects, revealing two pipes in defendant’s clothes.70
After the “pat-down” search, the officer proceeded to search the trunk
of the car without asking for further permission from the defendant.71
In the trunk, the officer found luggage, an ice chest, and two “torches”
but also noticed scratch marks on the screws that held the car’s stereo
speakers in place.72 The scratch marks indicated to the officer that the
speakers had been removed.73 The officer then removed the speakers
and discovered two packages containing a substance that later tested
positive as methamphetamine.74
The Government argued it had probable cause to search the trunk of
the vehicle based on the presence of various drug related items in the

66. Id. at 1224. Importantly, the “badly cracked front windshield” constitutes a motor vehicle
equipment violation under Utah law and justified the officer’s conduct in pulling over the car. Id.
67. Id. at 1224–25.
68. Id. at 1225. The officer also noticed a bottle of Visine and a road atlas, all of which, “in his
experience,” are items associated with drug trafficking. Id.
69. Id. at 1228. Note that the officer’s question in Wald is basically a “command in the form of a
question.” William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1016, 1064 (1995) (noting that if an officer “puts his command in the form of a question, consent is
deemed voluntary and the evidence comes in”). While the utterance made by the officer may not sound
very harsh out of context, the fact that it comes from the officer during a traffic stop gives the question
the “‘force’ of a command.” Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts
and the Question of Intent, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 194 (1986). This has the persuasive effect of eliciting
a positive response from the listener. Id.
70. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1225, 1228. Even though the officer found two pipes on Wald, Wald stated that
the pipes were not used for smoking illegal drugs. Id. at 1225.
71. Id. at 1225.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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car and the defendants’ physical appearance.75 Ultimately, the court
found no merit in the Government’s probable cause argument.76
Because the officer did not have probable cause to search the trunk,
the Government further argued that the defendant and driver consented
to a full vehicle search when they stated they did not mind if the officer
took a “quick look.”77 The Government bolstered its argument by
pointing out that the suspects failed to object to the officer’s search of
the trunk, which showed that the search must have been within the
scope of the defendant’s consent.78 However, the court responded that
the “failure to object” rule from Florida v. Jimeno only applies when
a suspect first gives the officer a “general authorization to search[,]”
and the defendant’s consent to a quick look provided a limited
authorization to search; thus, the Jimeno rule did not apply.79
The court also noted that, because the officer had (1) already found
drug paraphernalia on the defendant, (2) told the defendant that he was
75. Id. at 1226.
76. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228. The court found that probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle did
not exist because, under the “common-sense” holding in United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th
Cir. 1993), “it is unreasonable to believe people smoke [drugs] in the trunks of cars, the mere smell of
burnt [drugs] does not create the fair probability that the trunk contains [those drugs].” Wald, 216 F.3d at
1226.
77. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228–29.
78. Id. at 1228; see also United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We consistently
and repeatedly have held a defendant’s failure to limit the scope of a general authorization to search, and
failure to object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, is an indication
the search was within the scope of consent.”).
79. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted); see also Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (“A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search
to which he consents.”); Gordon, 173 F.3d at 766. The rule from Wald—that a defendant’s failure to
object is only a consideration where a suspect provides a general authorization to search—is at odds with
various other cases, which have interpreted the doctrine to apply to all cases, not just the general
authorization cases. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1368 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding an
officer’s search of the suspect’s hotel room bathroom where the suspect replied “‘go ahead’” to officers’
request to “‘look in’” the room, and the suspect failed to object when officer entered bathroom); United
States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 689 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding, when defendant gave general permission
to search his vehicle, this was deemed to include area under hood in light of absence of objection). At
best, the view regarding the failure to object rule taken by the court in Wald seems a bit circular. The court
stated that the failure to object rule only applies when the suspect gives a general authorization to search.
Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228. However, in determining whether a suspect provided a general or limited
authorization to search, courts objectively consider the facts of the case, including whether or not the
suspect objected to the search. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. Therefore, although the failure to object to a
search is a factor in determining whether a suspect provided a general or limited authorization to search,
according to Wald, it is only to apply when a suspect gives a general authorization. Wald, 216 F.3d at
1228.
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in a “bit of trouble,” and (3) told him and the driver that they “were not
free to go[,]” the defendant likely believed that he was already under
arrest and “therefore had no power to prevent the trunk
search.”80Accordingly, the court in Wald held that a suspect’s consent
to a conversational search request—in this case allowing the officer to
take a quick look—only allows an officer to search the inside of the
vehicle and does not extend to a search of the trunk of the car.81
2. Wald Compared With Other Restrictive View Federal Cases
Aside from Wald, very few federal cases have interpreted a
suspect’s consent to a conversational search request as a limited
authorization to search absent a suspect’s objection or other facts
indicating the consent only extends to a specific area.82
In United States v. Elliott, the court found that an officer exceeded
the scope of consent after receiving permission to “look through the
trunk” in order to “see what . . . [the suspect had] in there.”83 The
officer subsequently unzipped and looked through one of the bags in
the trunk.84 The court stated the officer’s conduct went too far in light
of his statement that he “did not want to look through each item” in the
trunk and “that he just wanted to see how things were packed.”85
In applying the objective reasonableness test from Jimeno,86 the
court found that the conversation between the suspect and officer
80. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228–29 (internal quotations omitted).
81. Id.
82. In a more recent case, United States v. Purcell, the court implied that consent to a “quick look”
authorizes an officer to perform a “cursory sweep.” United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 957 (6th Cir.
2008). While the court did not hold on the quick look language (because the individual, Crist, who
consented to the quick look later consented to a full search), the court stated that when Crist authorized
the police to “take a quick look around [defendant’s hotel] room[,]” the police did exactly what Crist had
“authorized them to do: perform a cursory sweep of the room.” Id. at 957.
83. United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
86. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s
consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”); see also
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (“[D]etermination of consent . . . must ‘be judged against
an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . “warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief”’ that the consenting party had authority over the premises?” (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968))).
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“would have conveyed to a reasonable person that [the officer] was
interested only in visually inspecting the trunk and its contents, and did
not convey his intent to look into any containers in the trunk.”87
Accordingly, the act of unzipping and looking through a bag in the
trunk violated the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.88
Similarly, in United States v. Neely, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals found the officer exceeded the scope of consent, but in this
case, the suspect asked the officer if he would like to “‘check’ his
trunk” for weapons.89 Although the officer subsequently searched the
passenger area of the car and found a weapon, the court found the
evidence was inadmissible because the suspect never consented to a
search of his entire vehicle.90 The court reasoned that, based on the
suspect’s clear statement limiting the search to the trunk of the vehicle,
the officer’s subsequent search of the interior of the vehicle fell outside
the scope of the suspect’s consent.91
3. The Restrictive View in State Courts
While Wald represents one of the relatively few instances in which
a federal court has construed conversational consent as providing a
limited authorization to search, state courts have been much more
amenable to the restrictive view.92 In People v. Baltazar, an Illinois
Court of Appeals case, a state patrolman pulled over defendant
87. Elliott, 107 F.3d at 815; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1(c) (5th ed. 2011)
(“When a purpose is included in the request, then the consent should be construed as authorizing only that
intensity of police activity necessary to accomplish the stated purpose.”).
88. Elliott, 107 F.3d at 815–16.
89. United States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346, 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2009).
90. Id. at 351, 352–53.
91. Id. at 350. Notably, the court also did not find the suspect’s failure to object to the officer’s search
of the interior of the vehicle sufficient to show that the suspect had expanded the scope of his original
consent. Id. at 351 (“Because Neely’s original consent did not physically encompass the interior of his
vehicle, under the specific circumstances of this case, we do not find his silence sufficiently persuasive to
overcome the limitation he originally placed on the search.”).
92. E.g., Jacobs v. State, 733 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Rodriguez v. State, 539 So.
2d 513, 513–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that, where the officer received permission from the
suspect to “‘look’ into the car[,]” the officer exceeded the scope of consent when he subsequently opened
a sealed cardboard box that he found in the back seat because the suspect gave no indication that his
consent to “‘look’ into the car” included consent to break open the sealed cardboard box); People v.
Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); State v. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d 677, 682 (Or. Ct. App.
1996).
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Baltazar for speeding in a rented U-Haul truck.93 The defendant stated
that he rented the truck to carry his personal belongings as he had just
moved to Detroit.94 The officer placed the defendant in his squad car
while he reviewed his license and rental agreement.95 After reviewing
the documents, the officer asked the defendant if he could “take a look”
inside the back of his U-Haul truck.96 Even though the officer never
gave a reason why he wanted to look in the truck, the defendant agreed
and the officer’s search ensued.97 During the officer’s search, he
discovered a number of personal items (couches, dressers, mattresses,
etc.)—all of which were consistent with the suspect’s story—but three
sealed cardboard boxes piqued his interest.98 The officer subsequently
opened the boxes, revealing 188 pounds of cannabis.99
The Baltazar court held that the officer’s act of opening the
cardboard boxes exceeded the scope of consent because the defendant
only agreed to let the officer “take a look” in the back of the U-Haul,100
and moreover, the officer failed to provide a reason for his more in
depth search.101 Because the defendant only agreed to allow the officer
to “take a look” in the back of the U-Haul, the officer’s search was
limited to looking for what the defendant expressed the truck
contained—personal belongings.102 Accordingly, for the officer to
legally open the cardboard boxes—which from the outside provided
no indication that they contained anything other than personal
93. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d at 1188.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d at 1188.
100. Id. at 1189 (internal quotations omitted). Note that the court decided the case both under the Fourth
Amendment and the Illinois State Constitution, which has very similar language to the U.S. Constitution.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”), with ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (“The people shall have
the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches,
seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”).
101. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d at 1190.
102. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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belongings—he needed to ask the defendant for his express consent to
search the boxes.103
Other state courts have taken a similar view regarding the restrictive
nature of conversational consent searches.104 In an Oregon case,
Jacobsen, the state Court of Appeals found that an officer exceeded
the scope of consent when a passenger said he would not mind if the
officer “look[ed] inside the cab” of his pickup truck, and the officer
subsequently opened a zipped duffel bag in the back seat, revealing an
unlawfully possessed firearm.105 The court concluded that, based on
the conversation, the suspect had authorized “a more general sweep of
the truck[]” rather than the thorough search that the officer actually
performed.106 Importantly, and consistent with both Baltazar and
Jacobsen, a Florida appeals court has stated that “a request to take ‘a
quick look around’” does not allow “the police to go beyond a plain
view search.”107
B. The Expanded View of Consent
By and large, the primary view taken by federal courts is that a
suspect’s consent to a quick look search authorizes the officer to
perform a full search.108 In these cases, the courts analyze the facts—
103. Id.
104. E.g., Jacobs v. State, 733 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Rodriguez v. State, 539 So.
2d 513, 513–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d 677, 682 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
105. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d at 682 (noting, however, that the defendant did not have an opportunity to
object to the search of the duffel bag because he was being questioned by another officer away from his
truck) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant, Jacobsen, argued that the officer’s conduct violated
both his Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution as well as his rights under the Oregon State
Constitution. Id. at 679. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, with OR. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (“No law shall
violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath,
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”).
106. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d at 682.
107. Jacobs, 733 So. 2d at 555 (stating that “deputies may have exceeded the scope of consent by
searching . . . clothing in [the suspect’s] closet or [by searching] in . . . other area[s] not in plain view”
where the suspect gave officers permission to “take ‘a quick look around’”).
108. E.g., United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rich,
992 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp.
2d 1217, 1225 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that, where defendant consented to the officer’s request to “‘take
a look’” in the vehicle defendant was driving, defendant had provided the officer with a general consent
to search), aff’d, 441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006).
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which closely mirror the restricted view cases from above—based on
the same rules and factors as the restricted view cases, yet come out on
the other side of the issue.109
1. Expanded View in the Name of Law Enforcement Efficiency
In United States v. Rich, a Texas district court held that the evidence
an officer discovered after he received consent to “look into”
defendant’s vehicle was inadmissible, but the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals overruled their decision.110 In Rich, an officer made a routine
traffic stop and proceeded to ask the suspect “if he could look into the
[truck].”111 The officer made the request three times without receiving
a response from the suspect and finally demanded that the suspect
answer his question, to which the suspect responded “yes.”112 The
officer proceeded to search the vehicle and found a suitcase, which he
opened, revealing marijuana.113
The defendant argued that, by unzipping the suitcase found in his
truck, the officer had exceeded his scope of consent.114 The district
court found that, even though the officer asked the suspect if he had
any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle when he first made the stop,
his subsequent request to “‘have a look in’” the truck did not grant him
permission to search for drugs or other contraband because he did not
“expressly or implicitly” ask to look for narcotics when he asked to
“‘look in’” the vehicle.115 Accordingly, an objective reasonable person
109. Compare United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000), with Rich, 992 F.2d at 506.
110. United States v. Rich, 791 F. Supp. 1162, 1165, 1170 (W.D. Tex. 1992), rev’d, 992 F.2d 502
(internal quotations omitted).
111. Rich, 992 F.2d at 504. The officer stopped the defendant because the defendant’s truck had a
broken license plate light. Id.
112. Id. The district court noted that “the repeated requests to ‘look in’ the defendant’s car . . . tend[ed]
to demonstrate coercion by the trooper, as well as the statement during the third request that the trooper
needed a yes or no answer.” Rich, 791 F. Supp. at 1165.
113. Rich, 992 F.2d at 504.
114. Id. at 505.
115. Rich, 791 F. Supp. at 1166–67. Accordingly, since “the scope of a search is generally defined by
its expressed object[,]” the officer did not receive authorization to open closed containers—like the
suitcase—when he simply asked to “‘look into the truck.’” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991);
Rich, 791 F. Supp. at 1165. The court also noted that the officer could “easily have asked [for] the
defendant’s permission to search for drugs” or “to search the contents of the suitcase.” Rich, 791 F. Supp.
at 1167.
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would not have believed the suspect’s scope of consent extended to the
suitcase in the back seat.116
The Texas district court’s decision and rationale parallel the
interpretation of similar language in Wald and the other state court
cases previously discussed.117 However, the court of appeals reversed,
finding that a reasonable person would have understood defendant’s
consent to include the inside of the vehicle and the inside of any
containers located therein.118
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling for two
primary reasons.119 First, the court stated that the entire conversation
between the officer and defendant—from stop to arrest—lasted
approximately five minutes, and based on the officer’s prior
statements, the defendant probably knew the officer wanted to search
for narcotics.120 Secondly, the court addressed the specific meaning of
the “look into” language.121 The defendant argued that the officer’s
request to look into the vehicle was a request to “see inside” the
vehicle.122 In support of his argument, he pointed out that the officer
had previously tried to see inside the vehicle but could not due to its
tinted windows.123 Importantly, the court noted that it “decline[d] the
defendant’s invitation to establish a list of specific terms from which
an officer must select . . . for each individual situation and/or
defendant” as it would “hamper” the duties of law enforcement
officers and contrast with the Fourth Amendment principle of
reasonableness.124 The court noted that several other circuits had
adopted a rule that conversational requests for consent provided the

116. Rich, 791 F. Supp. at 1166.
117. See discussion supra Part II.A.
118. Rich, 992 F.2d at 508.
119. See id. at 506–08.
120. Id. at 506–07. The defendant also argued that he did not have the opportunity to object to the search
or limit his consent because things happened so quickly. Id. at 507. The court rejected this argument,
stating that the defendant could have limited his consent when he first authorized the search to only what
was in plain view. Id.
121. Id. at 506.
122. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
123. Id.
124. Rich, 992 F.2d at 506.
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equivalent of a full request to search,125 and the Fifth Circuit decided
to follow their lead in this case.126
2. Expanded View Based on Failure to Object
Many of the expanded view cases are directly at odds with Wald.127
While Wald viewed a defendant’s failure to object as a moot point
unless the defendant originally gave the officer a general authorization
to search, the expanded view cases place much more emphasis on the
defendant’s failure to object.128 In United States v. Lopez-Mendoza,
two individuals, Rene and Santiago, stopped at a gas station, and while
inside, Rene “talked casually” with a police officer.129 Upon leaving,
the officer asked Rene if they had any drugs in their car, and when
Rene responded “‘no[,]’” the officer asked: “‘Do you care if I look and
see?’”130 Santiago responded “‘[g]o ahead’” but added that the officer
“‘don’t got no right.’”131 The officer stated that, since they agreed that
he could look, he was “‘going to go ahead and look real quick.’”132
The “real quick” search lasted about thirty minutes, included a drug
sniffing dog, and subsequently revealed three pounds of heroin.133 The
court found that, even though the search lasted so long, the search still
fell within the defendant’s scope of consent.134 The court reasoned that
125. E.g., United States v. Harris, 716 F. Supp. 1470, 1472 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that a request to
“look in” granted a general right to search), aff’d, 928 F.2d 1113 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892–93 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that a request to “‘look through’” is not so
vague as to provide a limited right to search).
126. Rich, 992 F.2d at 506 (“We take this opportunity to establish a similar rule for our own circuit: it
is not necessary for an officer specifically to use the term ‘search’ when he requests consent from an
individual to search a vehicle. We hold that any words, when viewed in context, that objectively
communicate to a reasonable individual that the officer is requesting permission to examine the vehicle
and its contents constitute a valid search request for Fourth Amendment purposes.”).
127. E.g., United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding officer’s search within
the scope of consent where suspect allowed the officer to take a “‘quick look’” through his bags and failed
to object to the search); Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892 (“Failure to object to the continuation of the search
under these circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the
consent.”).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 868–69 (8th Cir. 2010).
129. Id. at 863.
130. Id. at 864.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d at 868–69; see also United States v. Alcantar, 271 F.3d 731, 738 (8th
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both individuals “‘express[ed] no concern’” during the course of the
search and at no time did they “‘attempt to retract or narrow’”
consent.135 Thus, their failure to object to the search showed that it fell
within their scope of consent.136
Lopez-Mendoza represents just one of the many expanded view
cases that hold based on the suspect’s failure to object. In United States
v. Espinosa, the court found that an officer’s search was within the
suspect’s scope of consent where—during the fourteen minute
search—the defendant “stood beside his car expressing no concern
during [the] thorough and systematic search” and did not “attempt to
retract or narrow his consent.”137 In United States v. Porter, the court
found the search was “well within the scope of [defendant’s] consent”
where he “could have withdrawn his consent at any time” throughout
the course of the search but “failed to do so.”138
As was the case in Rich, some expanded view cases rule that the
conversational requests for consent grant a general authorization to
search in the interest of law enforcement efficiency, while others base
their decision on a view opposite from that taken in Wald—that a
defendant’s failure to object coupled with minimal corroborating
evidence are enough to show that the search fell within the defendant’s
scope of consent.139

Cir. 2001) (holding that at least the first hour of a search was within the scope of consent where neither
suspects “object[ed] to the length of the search” at any point).
135. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d at 868.
136. Id. at 868–69.
137. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986).
138. United States v. Porter, 49 F. App’x 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2002). These are just a couple of the many
examples construing a defendant’s failure to object to a search as consent to an officer’s full-blown search.
139. United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We decline the defendant’s invitation
to establish a list of specific terms from which an officer must select the most appropriate for each
individual situation and/or defendant. To so hamper law enforcement officials in their everyday duties
would be an unjustifiable extension of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be
‘reasonable.’”); Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892 (“Failure to object to the continuation of the search under these
circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the consent.”).
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III. THE FUTURE OF CONSENT LAW: A NEW STANDARD FOR
SHOWING VOLUNTARY CONSENT IN QUICK LOOK SEARCH CASES
As quick look and other conversational consent cases have
permeated through courts since Schneckloth, courts have proposed a
wide range of solutions to address the various issues associated with
consent searches.140 It is important to consider the proposed changes
to the consent doctrine in general as they would have a direct impact
on the law governing conversational consent searches and present
viable solutions to the problems associated with conversational
consent searches. The more popular propositions include the use of
consent forms by police,141 changes initiated at a state court level,142
changes in police procedures,143 and even abolishing the consent
doctrine altogether.144 In this section I will analyze the effect of some
of these proposed solutions to conversational consent search issues and
suggest courts adopt the restricted Wald view in conversational
consent cases absent a suspect’s subjective knowledge of the scope of
an officer’s search.145
A. Informed Consent and the Widespread Use of Consent Forms
The fact that suspects do not exactly know what they are consenting
to when they respond to a request to search is one of the many

140. E.g., Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1192–93 (proposing that courts adopt a doctrine of informed
consent, similar to the standard in the medical field, in Fourth Amendment cases); Tracey Maclin, The
Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 80 (2008)
(“[W]henever a person objects or refuses to provide consent . . . that refusal should bar further attempts
by the police to seek consent. Furthermore, a refusal to sign a written consent form should also operate
retroactively to invalidate an earlier oral consent.”); Arthur J. Park, Automobile Consent Searches: The
Driver’s Options in a Lose-Lose Situation, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 461, 474–77 (advocating for state
level changes to the consent doctrine and explaining the advantages of overruling the Schneckloth case);
Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 191–92 (1991)
(arguing that courts should only find valid consent where a suspect’s consent is in “response to a specific
and narrow request” to search by the officer); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 211, 258–71 (2002) (suggesting that the consent doctrine be eliminated altogether).
141. Strauss, supra note 140, at 255.
142. Park, supra note 140, at 474–76.
143. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 191–92.
144. Strauss, supra note 140, at 258–71.
145. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000).
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problems associated with consent searches.146 This problem is
compounded in conversational consent searches where the officer does
not clearly indicate he is requesting a suspect’s consent to search.147
As a result, some have proposed that courts adopt the doctrine of
informed consent from the medical context in Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases.148 This suggestion seeks to safeguard the
“ignorant” suspect from consenting to something that he does not fully
understand.149 In the medical surgery context, informed consent
“consists of an absolute duty imposed by law on physicians to inform
the patient of the nature of the surgery, the probable consequences, the
risks and hazards of the procedure, and the anticipated benefits before
obtaining the patient’s consent.”150 In his article, Professor Lassiter
suggests that the informed consent standard for physicians “makes
sense” and should be “no less applicable” in the Fourth Amendment
context.151
This approach, which would effectively overrule the holding in
Schneckloth,152 has great merit in the conversational consent search
case. By requiring individuals to know “the nature . . . the probable
consequences, the risks and hazards . . . and the [] benefits” of a search
prior to obtaining consent, suspects are able to make an informed
decision about whether they want to provide an officer with consent to
search.153 Specifically, this solution would help address one of the
146. This proposition, while not typically stated outright, is clear from the very fact that suspects argue
that the officer exceeded their scope of consent. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d
663, 667 (5th Cir. 2003) (addressing suspect’s argument that the officer exceeded his scope of consent).
The very fact that defendants argue an officer exceeded their scope of consent so often shows that
defendants are not really sure what they are consenting to.
147. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228. In some cases the officer makes it abundantly clear he is seeking consent
to perform a full search. See United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 515, 517 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
the officer asked the suspect “if she would consent to a search” then subsequently presented her with a
consent form, which the suspect signed indicating that she “‘freely consent[ed]’” to the search). In
conversational or quick look cases sometimes the request is not so clear as to alert the suspect that the
officer is seeking the consent to perform a full-blown search. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228 (noting that an
officer addressed the suspect by stating: “‘You wouldn’t mind if I take a quick look, would you?’”).
148. Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1193.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1192.
151. Id. at 1192–93.
152. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that individuals need not know
that they have a right to refuse consent for their consent to be valid).
153. Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1192.
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primary issues in conversational consent searches—that individuals do
not know they may be providing an officer with consent to perform a
full search when agreeing to a conversational statement like “‘would
you mind if I look inside the cab[?]’”154
Moreover, the aims of the informed consent doctrine would likely
be furthered through the widespread use of consent forms by law
enforcement officers. Officers would still have to inform a suspect of
the consequences, risks, and benefits of consenting to a search but
would additionally require suspects to sign a form confirming that the
suspect had been informed of their rights. For example, the Drug
Enforcement Agency has used a consent form titled “CONSENT TO
SEARCH,” which provides: “1. I have been asked to permit special
agents of the drug enforcement administration to search . . . 2. I have
not been threatened nor forced in any way. 3. I freely consent to this
search.”155
Typically when these forms are used in other contexts, the officer
requires the suspect to read the form and then reads the form back to
the suspect, asking if the suspect has any questions periodically
throughout the reading.156 As with informed consent, requiring
suspects to sign a consent form would ensure that they have actually
been informed of their rights and options concerning consent to search,
and it also confirms their knowledge in writing.157 This additional
writing requirement would further alleviate the confusion that goes
along with a conversational consent search.
While critics of informed consent and consent forms might point out
that a large number of search and seizure cases involve non-native
English speakers,158 at least some law enforcement agencies have
154. State v. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d 677, 682 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
155. United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 517 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration
in original).
156. E.g., United States v. Nikzad, 739 F.2d 1431, 1432 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Agent Marcello gave Nikzad
a DEA Consent to Search form and asked him to read it. Nikzad appeared to do so. Marcello then read
the form aloud to Nikzad, and asked after each line if Nikzad had any questions.”).
157. Other articles regarding consent have suggested that, in order for consent to be valid, it must be in
writing. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 192 (“Consent should be in writing—either a warrant or consent
form would suffice.”).
158. A 2007 study by the U.S. Census Bureau indicated that almost 20% of households in the U.S.
primarily spoke a language other than English in the home. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE IN
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already addressed this problem.159 For example, as of the end of 2011
the New York Police Department used consent to search forms in
seven different languages and also employed a service known as
“Language Line,” which enables officers to make a phone call at any
time if they need a translator.160 Accordingly, adopting informed
consent and the use of consent forms might produce favorable results
in the conversational consent search field even in light of some
challenges such as a language barrier.
Logically, these solutions would have the positive effect of
decreasing the number of consent searches performed by officers as
individuals would realize that they have a right to refuse consent.
However, in practice this might not be the case. Notably, the coercive
nature of police searches would still be an issue if courts required
informed consent or consent forms because the same underlying cause
of coercion, the environment in which the search occurs, would still be
present.161 Additionally, while “many [police] departments currently
require or encourage their officers to tell suspects of their right not to
consent before obtaining consent to search[,]” there is at least some
suggestion that this does not have a significant impact on the number
of consent searches suspects agree to.162
While no one can precisely predict the outcome of implementing an
informed consent policy, a suspect’s knowledge of his rights in similar
contexts has proved to have an unappreciable impact on the number of
suspects who forego those rights. Take for example the Miranda

THE UNITED STATES: 2007 1 (2010), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-12.pdf. The

study also noted, “the population speaking a language other than English at home has increased steadily
for the last three decades.” Id.
159. E.g., Rocco Parascandola, ‘Consent to Search’ Forms, Now Available in Seven Languages, Allow
Police to Bypass Warrant Process, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2011, 4:00 AM), http:www.nydailynews.
com/news/crime/consent-search-forms-languages-police-bypass-warrant-process-article-1.962160.
160. Id.
161. Strauss, supra note 140, at 254. If law required the use of consent forms or informed consent the
coercion problem would still exist because “police officers [would be] providing the information in the
same coercive environment that existed before.” Id.
162. Id. The Strauss article mentions that in the Miranda warning context 80–90% of suspects still
waived their rights even when they had knowledge of the right to refuse. Id. at 254 n.154. While the
Miranda and consent contexts are vastly different, this at least shows that knowledge of the right to refuse
may not be as powerful as logic would suggest.
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warning.163 If you have seen an episode of Law & Order or Matlock or
any one of the thousands of police and legal based television dramas,
you can likely recite some form of the Miranda warning: “You have
the right to remain silent . . . Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law” and so on.164 While one would think that
a Miranda warning would impact the number of people who chose to
talk to police after receiving the warning, “the overwhelming majority
of suspects waive their rights and agree to talk to the police without
the assistance of counsel.”165 In fact, studies suggest that somewhere
between 78% and 96% of suspects waive their rights166 and that more
than ten times as many suspects waived their Miranda rights as
invoked their rights.167 No evidence suggests that the outcome would
be appreciably different if courts required a similar warning in the
consent context. Thus, while the doctrine of informed consent and the
use of consent forms might seem like they go a long way toward
improving conversational consent search issues, there is at least some
suggestion that this may not provide the most effective solution to the
problem.
B. Encouraging Change by State Legislature and Local Law
Enforcement
As states are often better positioned to make tailored improvements
for the particular needs of their citizens, some have proposed that state
action168 or changes to local law enforcement practices169 are the
solution to the problems raised by consent searches. While
Schneckloth and other federal cases dealing with consent control state
courts insofar as they analyze issues under the Fourth Amendment,
163. The Miranda warning spawned from the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
164. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 374–75 (2010).
165. Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 375, 379–80 (2011).
166. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1000, 1012 (2001).
167. George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1976 (2004).
168. Park, supra note 140, at 474–76.
169. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 191–92.
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“each state has the power to impose higher standards on searches and
seizures under state law than is required by the Federal
Constitution.”170 Accordingly, some state courts have taken up the
issue and provided that a higher standard—for example, a suspect’s
actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent—is required to obtain
valid consent.171 While changes on a state level would likely be more
tailored to the individual needs of their citizens, changes are unlikely
to come anytime soon as evidenced by the very limited number of
states that have addressed the issue over the past four decades.172
Likewise, local law enforcement agencies could change their
practices. Ideally, departments across the country would adopt
“specific controls,” which aim to improve the problems associated
with consent searches by changing the way officers seek consent from
suspects.173 For instance, rather than asking vague, conversational
questions in an effort to obtain consent, police departments could adopt
a clear phrase that officers use whenever they seek consent from a
170. State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (N.J. 1975) (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)).
171. Id. at 68 (“[W]here the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden of
showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse
consent.”); see also Park, supra note 140, at 475–76 (“In Minnesota, the prosecution’s claim of voluntary
consent in the routine traffic stop context is subject to ‘careful appellate review’ due to the ability to pull
over virtually anyone, the ‘enormous discretion in enforcing traffic laws,’ and the inherently coercive
nature of a traffic stop. In South Dakota, the state must prove the voluntariness of consent by clear and
convincing evidence.” (footnote omitted) (citing State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579–80 (Minn. 1997);
State v. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d 477, 478 (S.D. 1991))). These cases seem to be consistent with the former
view taken by courts that consent to search was effectively a waiver of a constitutional right. Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (emphasizing the fact that an individual needs to know that he is
giving up a legal right in order to waive it).
172. See, e.g., George, 557 N.W.2d at 579–80; Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d. 547, 558 (Miss. 1983);
Johnson, 346 A.2d at 68; Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d at 478.
173. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 192. In his note, Rotenberg illustrates a few different ideas of
“specific controls” that might be effective:
1) A minimum standard should be met, whether with or without a warrant, before consent
may be sought—the standard could be a blend of need and level of belief, e.g., “reasonable
need and suspicion.” 2) The context of consent should be limited, e.g., to residences.
Automobiles are deserving of greater protection from police searches than they currently
receive, and containers because of their variety in type and context should not be
considered a single category. 3) Consent to search should not be extended to include
consent to seize; probable cause should be required. 4) Third party consent given in
response to a police officer’s request to search the privacy interests of another should not
be valid. 5) Consent should be in writing—either a warrant or consent form would suffice.
Id.
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suspect that indicates they are seeking consent to search a clearly
defined and tailored area. For example, if an officer would like to
search the trunk of a suspect’s vehicle during a traffic stop, the officer
could pose the following question to the suspect: “Do you consent to
me performing a full search of the trunk of your car, which could
include examination of any open or closed container therein?” In the
case that both the officer and the suspect speak English, it would be
very hard for a defendant to argue that he did not understand that he
was consenting to a search or that the officer exceeded his scope of
consent by removing a speaker in the trunk—as was the case in
Wald.174 In addition to adopting a standard request for consent
question, officers could be required to ask for a suspect’s consent in
every new area in which they intend to search. This requirement would
ensure that the officer never exceeds the scope of the suspect’s consent
even when he moves from the trunk to the passenger area of the
vehicle—as was the case in Chaidez.175
While the examples above clearly do not exhaust the list of potential
changes police departments could make, changes of this type would
go a long way in improving the issues with conversational consent
searches. This solution, unlike others, would not overrule the
foundations of consent jurisprudence such as Schneckloth but would
still be an admirable step towards alleviating the problems with
conversational consent searches.
However, action at the local law enforcement level has its
drawbacks as well. Even though the issues with conversational consent
searches stem from police departments themselves—it is in fact the
officers who ask to take a quick look in the first place—getting
departments to change their conduct on a national basis is easier said
than done. “[P]olice procedures are generally determined on the local
level” and implementing an across the board change would require an
enormous number of “independent decisions” by local law
enforcement agencies; a feat not easily achieved.176 Not to mention,
174. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000).
175. United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 382 (8th Cir. 1990).
176. Park, supra note 140, at 474.
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police departments likely would not readily adopt a policy that might
“hamper” one of their most effective law enforcement tools.177
C. Abolishing Consent
As many proposed solutions to consent law in general, such as those
listed above, all have fairly substantial drawbacks; many authors have
advocated for the drastic solution that courts abolish the voluntary
consent doctrine altogether.178 One of the foremost advocates of
abolishing the consent exception, Professor Marcy Strauss, noted that
courts have justified the use of consent searches on two main grounds:
“First, consent searches promote the interests of law enforcement.
Second, individuals may benefit from voluntary consent, and in any
event should have the right to decide whether they want to allow the
police to engage in a search.”179
Strauss goes on to discredit these two arguments.180 In response to
the police efficiency argument, Strauss notes that there is a lack of
empirical evidence showing that consent searches are necessary or that
they vastly improve efficiency of the police.181 While this may be true,
it is hard to argue that consent searches do not provide a benefit to our
nation’s police officers. As stated previously, voluntary consent
searches provide officers with “the depth and breadth of the search”
that they want.182 Without the consent search, law enforcement officers
would have to resort to other options such as obtaining a warrant or
conducting thorough investigations that could potentially lead
nowhere at the cost of precious law enforcement resources.
In response to the individual benefit and right to choose
justification, Strauss states that individuals likely do not receive any
177. United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1993).
178. E.g., Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 192 (“If upgrading the consent search by modifying police
practices or individual consent or both proves unsatisfactory, then the obvious alternative is to abolish the
consent search altogether.”); Strauss, supra note 140, at 271 (“The power imbalance, the likelihood of
coercion, and the difficulty in assessing the voluntariness of the situation all weigh in favor of a per se
ban on consent.”).
179. Strauss, supra note 140, at 258–59.
180. Id. at 260, 268.
181. Id. at 260.
182. Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172.
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benefit from consenting to a search because without consent the officer
will likely have to leave the individual alone and with the consent—
assuming the individual does not have any illegal contraband—the
police have to leave him alone anyway.183 In this instance, Strauss has
considerable merit in her argument. However, when weighed against
the benefit officers likely receive from consent searches, even with the
lack of empirical evidence, the scales tip in favor of the availability of
a consent exception to the warrant requirement.
D. Proposed Solution to the Conversational Consent Issue
The solutions outlined above all provide at least a marginal benefit
in the conversational consent search context; however, all of the
solutions come with significant drawbacks. Therefore, courts should
adopt the restrictive view taken in Wald and in a variety of state courts;
consent to a conversational or quick look search provides the officer
with a limited authorization to search.184 As courts begin to exclude
evidence found in response to a suspect’s consent to a quick look
search request—evidence that typically forms the basis of the charge
against the defendant—law enforcement agencies will be persuaded to
change their practices, effectively eliminating the use of
conversational requests to search and the unique issues they present to
consent searches in general.
By adopting this rule, courts would need to clearly define what
constitutes a quick look or conversational consent search. In the
interest of promoting educated decisions by suspects, courts should
consider any request in which an officer does not clearly indicate that
he is seeking consent to search and any request that is not “specific and
narrow”185 as a conversational request to search. While this rule might
seem unduly restrictive to officers on its face, enforcement officials
still have a wide variety of tools at their disposal to get “the depth and

183. Strauss, supra note 140, at 266–67.
184. E.g., United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000); Jacobs v. State, 733 So. 2d
552, 555–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998);
State v. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d 677, 682 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
185. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 192.
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breadth of the search” that they want.186 If courts adopted this rule,
many of the other solutions proposed above would likely come to
fruition.
By adopting this rule, courts would still advance the overall purpose
of consent searches—promoting law enforcement efficiency187—
while not imposing a substantial burden on an individual’s
constitutional rights. Additionally, this rule leaves the foundations of
consent law unscathed, as it does not have any considerable impact on
the decisions set forth in Schneckloth,188 Jimeno,189 or Rodriguez.190
Overall, adopting a restricted view in conversational consent cases
strikes the appropriate balance between police efficiency and retaining
individual liberties.
CONCLUSION
In light of the vast expansion of police power over the last few
decades, it has become increasingly important for courts to limit the
power that the government can exert over U.S. citizens. Since courts
began to recognize the voluntary consent exception to the warrant
requirement in 1946,191 it has been used increasingly by police forces
as an “eas[y]” and efficient means of obtaining “the depth and breadth
of the search” they want.192 However, police have begun to disguise
their requests to search in conversational questions like: “Can I take a
quick look?”193

186. Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172.
187. Strauss, supra note 140, at 258–59.
188. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the right to refuse
consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the
sine qua non of an effective consent.”).
189. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (“A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the
scope of the search to which he consents.”).
190. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (holding in part that the “determination of
consent . . . must ‘be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the
moment . . . “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief”’ that the consenting party had authority
over the premises?” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968))).
191. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947) (per curiam).
192. See Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172.
193. E.g., United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000).
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In addition to the issues present in consent cases—such as whether
consent was actually voluntarily given—conversational consent cases
present the unique problem that individuals may not even know that
they are consenting to a full search of their vehicle or property. In light
of this, a minority of both state and federal courts have held that
consent to a conversational request to search only grants the officer a
limited authorization to search194 while the majority of courts have
held that it provides the officer with the ability to perform a full-blown
search.195
In considering the various solutions to the conversational or quick
look search, it is important to weigh the balance between law
enforcement efficiency—an important consideration in light of the
serious safety concerns facing the country—and the preservation of
civil liberties and individual rights. With this balance in mind, courts
should adopt the restricted view of the scope of consent granted in
conversational consent cases. This rule, while consistent with the
historical foundations of consent law, will require officers around the
country to change their practices in a manner that would be
significantly more beneficial to individuals and the criminal justice
system as a whole.

194. See discussion infra Part II.A.
195. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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